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1 Introduction 
Every mortgage is associated with a specific location in which its collateral is based in a way in which 
other assets on bank balance sheets are not. This location matters for the lender in at least three ways. 
First, different regional markets are often characterized by different intensity of competition so that the 
same bank can earn higher margins in one market than in another. Second, regions matter also for risk 
management. To start with, collateral prices in one region may be deemed more over-heated than those 
in another. More importantly, as long as house prices in different regions are at least not perfectly 
correlated in up- and downturns, lending to one region may improve the diversification of the mortgage 
portfolio of a bank previously concentrated in other regions, while yielding smaller or no diversification 
benefits to a bank already concentrated in that region to start with. Third, beyond revenue and risk 
management considerations, different locations may also imply different operational costs, as lending 
to different locations may give a bank different potential for automation. 
These three sets of considerations suggest that banks may have reasons to prefer lending to one location 
over lending to another. In practice however many banks cannot freely choose even across the full 
territory for which they hold a banking license, as they can traditionally acquire and serve new customers 
only in those regions in which they already have a sufficiently dense network of branches, adequately 
trained staff, and are sufficiently known to potential customers. Establishing all of this implies 
significant initial cost. Relatedly, as researchers we cannot directly attribute the geographical 
distribution of a bank’s lending to its preferences, as part of it may result simply from legacies.  
Both for banks and for us as researchers however, things have started to change with the appearance of 
FinTechs that offer online mortgage platforms where potential borrowers from across the country can 
apply for a mortgage and potential lenders from across the country can serve them. In this paper we 
exploit data from the Swiss platform Comparis.ch. Beyond breaking down historical legacies of 
geography, these data have two other major advantages. First, we observe mortgage applications pre-
intermediation and subsequent lender responses and can hence distinguish demand and supply in a way 
not possible with data on completed contracts or data at even higher levels of aggregation. Second, we 
observe for each application not just the response from one, but from several different banks. This allows 
us to analyze how different banks respond to the same borrower and thus break any endogenous 
matching of different types of borrowers to different types of lenders. Following pioneering work by 
Khwaja and Mian (2008), this feat has been achieved more recently by several papers on bank lending 
to large firms with more than one bank relationship, such as Jimenez et al (2012, 2014). By contrast, it 
is less common for households to entertain active relationships with several different banks, or at least 
for researchers to observe relationships with different banks for the same household. Identification of 
the quality of Khwaja and Mian (2008) has therefore, to our knowledge, been achieved for lending to 
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households only by two papers so far. First, Basten (forthcoming) was the first to exploit the Comparis 
data analyzed here and found that higher counter-cyclical capital requirements caused more affected 
banks to raise prices relatively more, and thereby caused a shift of new lending from more to less affected 
banks. Second, Michelangeli and Sette (2016) obtained responses from different banks to the same 
household by sending randomized simulated mortgage applications to different banks. 
Analyzing data on multiple banks’ responses to each of 6’920 household mortgage applications made 
through the Swiss online platform Comparis.ch between 2010 and 2013, we obtain three main sets of 
findings. First, we find that more online competitors lead banks to make more and better offers, in 
particular when offering to cantons (states) where offline competition has been less intense. This is in 
line with banks seeking to “get a foot in the door” in particular in those regions where they can expect 
to gain the most profitable follow-on business. This reasoning is based on retail clients subject to 
switching costs, so they tend to bring more revenues to banks they have dealt with before. For clients, 
especially those in so far less competitive cantons, the online channel thus yields more and better offers. 
Second, we find that banks seek the online channel in particular to lend more to cantons more distant 
from their home cantons, to cantons where house prices are deemed less over-heated relative to those in 
their home cantons, or where past house price changes have been less correlated with those at home. 
Although we do not yet observe a noteworthy number of defaults in either closer or more distant 
locations, the type of lending analyzed and explained in more detail below warrants the interpretation 
that the increase in regional diversification which the online channel thus allows does overall improve 
the risk management on banks’ mortgage portfolios. This is because for the standardized mortgage 
lending analyzed collateral values across the country are assessed with the same hedonic models, so 
being local offers limited to no extra information. 
Third, we find that cross-sectionally banks automate mortgage lending decisions more for less risky 
applications as well as when they themselves are larger or more specialized in mortgage lending. More 
interestingly, we also find that the longer banks have been lending online the more they manage to 
automate their decision-making, which has the potential to lower banks’ operational costs without 
unduly sacrificing the quality of decision-making. 
In addition, we are able to analyze how much offers extended to literally the same household differ 
across lenders. We find more dispersion the higher the associated credit risk, and the lower the expected 
profitability of the canton offered to. 
With our three main sets of findings, we contribute to several strands of the literature. First we contribute 
to the literature on how distance and technology affect the degree of competition in banking (Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Degryse et al, 2009; Eichholtz et al, 2019) with results on 
how the role of distance is modified as sufficiently standardized bank lending moves to the internet. 
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of regional diversification on bank risk-taking. 
There is by now an extensive literature that exploited the US interstate bank deregulation as evidenced 
by Goetz et al (2013, 2016) and references therein. While Goetz et al (2013) find increases in regional 
diversification to have reduced average stock market valuations of US bank holding companies, Goetz 
et al (2016) find that it did nonetheless overall reduce bank riskiness as measured by the standard 
deviation (SD) of bank stock returns as well as the Z-score or other risk measures. They argue that the 
hedging of idiosyncratic local risks dominated potential reductions in banks’ ability to monitor loans 
located at a larger distance. While their risk measures cover banks’ entire balance sheets, including loans 
to firms and other assets, we focus more specifically on how banks can better diversify specifically their 
mortgage portfolios, where local knowledge is arguably relatively less important. Furthermore, online 
lending decisions can still be made by the same central decision-maker, removing the agency problems 
between bank headquarter and local credit officers that may be associated with larger distance. The 
online platform analyzed may thus reduce agency costs even beyond the level analyzed by Berger and 
DeYoung (2004) who saw reductions in distance-related agency costs within US bank holding 
companies through improvements in information processing and telecommunications. With a view to 
more recent work on new technology labeled “FinTech”, our results are consistent with those by Fuster 
et al (2019) who find that US lenders using newer technology (“FinTech”) do not necessarily target 
riskier borrowers. 
Third, we bring together the recent literature on how the internet changes price setting (see 
Gorodnichenko and Talavera, 2017, Gorodnichenko et al,  2018, and Cavallo, 2017) with an extant 
literature on rules or automation vs. discretion. Gorodnichenko and Talavera point out that online sales 
are characterized by lower frictions of price adjustment, easier search and price comparisons, and a more 
limited influence of geographical barriers. They then show empirically that this leads to more frequent 
price adjustments and therefore to faster price convergence in response to nominal exchange rate 
movements, yet some persistence remains. In the lending setup we study, prices can be adjusted more 
easily also offline as each client receives an offer customized to his or her particular risk characteristics. 
But the lowering of search costs and removal of geographical barriers are likely to matter here as well. 
We investigate for which cases in particular this greater ease for customers in comparing prices 
customized to them reduces the degree of discretion. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our hypotheses in the areas of 
respectively competition, risk management, and automation, as well as on the dispersion of offers 
received by each household. Section 3 then introduces our data and Section 4 provides more details on 
how we empirically analyze each area. Section 5 provides our results and Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Hypotheses 
In this section we develop hypotheses, based on prior literature as well as economic intuition, on how 
the internet channel changes mortgage lending along the three dimensions of respectively competition, 
risk management through regional diversification, and automation. In addition, we develop a hypothesis 
on which types of borrowers we expect to attract the most diverse set of offers. 
2.1 Hypotheses on Competition 
With the appearance of the online channel, we need to consider both direct competitors who also offer 
mortgages online and indirect competitors who offer to the same market offline. For direct competitors 
intuition follows the lines of basic models of banking competition such as the oligopolistic version of 
the Monti-Klein model as outlined in Freixas and Rochet (2008). There banks set lower optimal lending 
margins to obtain sufficiently large lending volumes the higher the number of competitors. So we posit 
Hypothesis 1a: Banks offer prices with lower margins the higher the number of online competitors.  
In the basic oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model, banks optimize lending and deposit business 
separately, with any difference in volumes being lent to or borrowed from the interbank market. 
Furthermore, they do so for a single period only. More realistically, clients in retail banking tend to buy 
packages of services from the same bank including several components of mortgage loans, mortgage 
loan refinancing, deposit accounts, transaction accounts, or investment advice. One key reason why 
customers do not shop around afresh for every banking service they need are switching costs. Thus 
Beggs and Klemperer (1992) mention in their pioneering paper on switching costs as one of two 
examples the effort required to close a transactions account with one bank, open one with another, and 
transfer all transactions information. Referring more specifically to lending, Sharpe (1990) and the 
refinement by von Thadden (2004), as well as Chapter 3.6 of Freixas and Rochet (2008), point out that 
lending requires the bank to make some upfront investment into screening and monitoring the client, 
which has already been made when the loan needs to be renewed, and may be required even less when 
the bank has furthermore gained additional information about the client during past interactions. As a 
new lender would still need to pay these costs and typically pass them through to the borrower, the 
existing lender can add a markup for new lending. Sharpe (1990) then points out that such a setup “drives 
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banks to lend to new firms at interest rates which initially generate expected losses”, expecting that later 
markup increases make this worthwhile.1  
For online offering of mortgages, the opportunity to earn more with a client won now implies that it is 
particularly attractive to gain new clients in cantons where competition has so far been less intense and 
on these grounds we posit: 
Hypothesis 1b: Banks offer prices with lower margins the less intense is offline competition in a canton.  
In addition to measuring the intensity of pre-existing competition in offline mortgage markets with the 
standard Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), as explained in more detail in our strategy section below, 
we are also interested in the effect of banks meeting their competitors in other markets. Following 
Edwards (1955) idea of a “linked oligopoly”, we thus posit: 
Hypothesis 1c: More multi-market contact increases banks’ incentives to collude and hence leads them 
to behave less competitively. 
In their analyses of how market power influences loan pricing, Degryse and Ongena (2005) found that 
firms must on average pay higher prices the smaller the distance to the bank, relative to other banks. 
Similar findings were made for other markets by Petersen and Rajan (2000) as well as by Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010). As switching banks would imply higher travel costs for periodically required in-
person meetings, a bank that is located closer to a client than its competitors can thus exploit the extra 
convenience it can offer along that dimension by adding a larger margin. Of course such larger margins 
may then also reflect the additional costs to the bank of maintaining a larger network of branches that 
allow it to be the closest bank to a larger number of customers. Given these findings, we might at first 
sight expect offered lending margins to increase in distance also in our setup. 
However, the financing of owner-occupied residential property in Switzerland differs from that of firms 
along at least two relevant dimensions. First, unless there is a severe crisis, residential mortgage 
borrowers typically do not need to see their bank after their mortgage initiation. This may be different 
in countries like the UK in which it is not uncommon for households to increase their mortgage loan 
when house prices have been rising in order to take out equity, or in countries like the US where 
households may choose to repay their mortgage early when interest rates have fallen. In Switzerland by 
contrast, taking out equity is uncommon and strategic early repayment is ruled out through high early 
repayment fees. Second, for mortgage lending the distance between bank and borrower matters not only 
in terms of market power, but at least as much for the bank’s risk management. While, depending on its 
                                                     
1 In line with this, Basten and Mariathasan (2018) find that Swiss banks decided to leave deposit rates non-negative even in 
times of negative interbank rates. This made the deposit business per se loss-making, yet banks prioritized retaining their 
deposit clients in the expectation of making profits from them again later. 
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sector, a firm whose sales area is struggling economically may often have some leeway to sell to other 
markets so that its ability to repay need not be tied to the economic developments in one particular 
region only, a house is by definition immobile and its value therefore intimately tied to the economic 
well-being in its area. Thus how a bank distributes its mortgage portfolio geographically matters for risk 
management. How it does is hence what we address in the next subsection. 
2.2 Hypotheses on Regional Diversification 
As mortgage lending to different regions implies different risks, we can interpret the margins implied 
by the prices offered as an indicator of how keen a bank is to lend to different regions, keeping fixed 
personal borrower characteristics and rate fixation period. On the one hand, risk managers may want to 
consider the fact that historically economic downturns in different regions are not fully synchronized 
due to inter-regional differences in economic specialization and in immigration patterns. Therefore 
probabilities of default and collateral values may also behave differently. So a bank can reduce risks to 
its mortgage portfolio by allocating a larger share to regions expected to exhibit a lower house price 
correlation with those in which it has so far conducted the majority of its mortgage lending. Indeed, 
Quigly and Van Order (1991) analyzed how actual mortgage defaults in the US are correlated intra- and 
inter-regionally and infer that mortgage portfolios are indeed riskier if they are less regionally 
diversified. As a consequence, they suggest that capital requirements associated with mortgage lending 
should be higher not only when the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is higher but also when the portfolio is 
less diversified. 
On the other hand, firstly a bank’s risk managers may instead prefer to focus their lending on fewer 
regions so that it pays to collect more information there. This sensible argument is made by Loutskina 
and Strahan (2011) and empirically confirmed for the US market. Further, Favara and Giannetti (2017) 
show both theoretically and empirically that a bank with many mortgages in the same region can better 
internalize the negative externalities of collateral liquidations on the prices of other nearby collateral in 
an episode of increased defaults. This by itself would speak in favor of seeking to sufficiently dominate 
one area in order to internalize and therefore ideally remove that externality. Finally, Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010) show that banks find it easier to screen firm lenders located closer to them, which is 
typically the place where a bank has already done most lending in the past. In the same vein, Eichholtz 
et al (2019) find US banks add margins increasing in distance when pricing mortgages underlying 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) and interpret their measure of distance as a proxy for 
reduced access to soft information. 
To assess whether the benefits of hedging against idiosyncratic local risk or agency problems associated 
with greater distance dominate empirically, Goetz et al (2016) analyze the effects of US interstate 
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branching deregulation and find that it does overall reduce bank risk, both when measured as the 
standard deviation of bank stock returns and when measured by Z-scores or other measures. This is so 
despite the fact that Goetz et al (2013) find greater regional diversification to reduce banks’ average 
stock prices. In fact, already Berger and DeYoung (2006) show that technological progress, associated 
in their case with more credit scoring based on more hard rather than soft information as well as with 
more advanced telecommunication technologies, can reduce the agency costs associated with greater 
distance. This confirmed empirically arguments made theoretically by Stein (2000). 
More specifically in the segment of lending studied here, regulation restricts the maximum LTV ratio 
to 90% and the maximum LTI ratio to effectively 6, so that none of the mortgages is as risky as some 
uncollateralized lending can be. More importantly, collateral values are typically not assessed 
physically, but through hedonic models bought from one of three consulting companies and are based 
on the same model for all of Switzerland. Finally, all banks have the same hard information on each 
customer and no soft information in the sense relevant e.g. in the setup of Eichholtz et al. Therefore the 
context complies with one characterized by Stein (2000) as based fully on hard rather than soft 
information. The only dimension along which a geographically closer bank might reach a different 
assessment on the basis of the same information is that it may attach a more or less positive value to the 
applicant’s postcode area than a bank with less local knowledge. Therefore we expect the diversification 
motif to dominate and posit: 
Hypothesis 2: Banks will offer better prices to borrowers, after fully controlling for both lender and 
borrower characteristics, when: 
(a) The borrower resides a longer distance away from the bank’s headquarters. 
(b) Real estate prices in the applicant’s region are deemed less over-heated relative to prices in the 
bank’s home region, especially for applicants with higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. 
(c) House prices in the canton have historically exhibited a lower correlation with those in the 
canton where the bank is headquartered. 
All four dimensions are related to the distribution of the bank’s pre-existing mortgage portfolio across 
Switzerland’s 26 cantons: As all banks in our sample have on average larger fractions of their pre-
existing mortgage portfolios in their home canton or directly neighboring cantons, lending to cantons 
that are further away in kilometers or driving minutes, whose prices are deemed less over-heated relative 
to those in the bank’s home canton, or where house price growth is historically less positively correlated 
with that in the bank’s home canton, can all improve the bank’s risk management. 
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2.3 Hypotheses on Automation vs. Discretion 
Any of the determinants of mortgage pricing discussed in the previous subsections can be effective by 
automating rules, through a computer or by communicating common policies for staff to follow. 
Alternatively, if staff retain sufficient leeway they may take into account also other factors. In the context 
studied, we dispose of all hard information the bank received through the Comparis platform and would 
therefore expect less heterogeneity in offers than in contexts in which loan officers may dispose of 
additional soft information. Yet the same information on an applicant’s postcode may be interpreted 
differently by different loan officers or on different days.  
An interesting way to formalize this idea is to build on the model of multiplicative heteroscedasticity 
formulated by Harvey (1976) and used in a bank lending context by amongst others Cerqueiro et al 
(2011). That paper finds more discretion for loans that are smaller, unsecured or go to smaller and more 
opaque firms, which can be rationalized by the idea that decisions in these cases are harder to automate 
well and are hence more likely to be escalated to (senior) staff. In our context, all loans are mortgages 
and hence all are collateralized, but we posit: 
Hypothesis 3a: We expect more discretion in loan pricing for applications that at first sight appear more 
risky, i.e. applications with higher loan-to-value (LTV), or higher loan-to-income (LTI) ratios, or less 
standard collateral. 
Beyond borrower characteristics, we hypothesize that the amount of discretion is likely to vary also with 
bank characteristics. In particular, banks that are larger or more specialized in mortgage-lending likely 
have more observations on which to calibrate automated lending decisions, and may also find it 
worthwhile to pay a higher fixed cost for fine-tuning such rules. Therefore we posit: 
Hypothesis 3b: We expect less discretion from banks that are larger or from banks more specialized in 
mortgage lending. 
Both considerations apply to online lending as much as to the offline lending analyzed e.g. by Cerqueiro 
et al, yet the online channel is to some extent different in that banks will learn only over time how 
attractive to borrowers they must shape their offers to have them accepted. On these grounds we posit 
Hypothesis 3c: We expect that discretion decreases, or put differently automation increases, the longer 
a bank has been offering mortgages online through the Comparis platform here analyzed. 
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2.4 Hypotheses on the Dispersion of Offers within each Household 
Above we have connected the characteristics of responses to those of banks, those of applying 
households, and those of their interaction. But given that we observe for each household up to 10, more 
often up to 7, and on average a bit over 4 responses, another issue of relevance is how different these 
responses are. In the existing literature, both Gurun et al (2016) and Bhutta et al (2019) have 
demonstrated that the same (type of) borrower may end up paying different prices to different lenders. 
Gurun et al relate price dispersion to lenders’ advertising and borrowers’ deemed sophistication, while 
Bhutta et al relate it to to borrower risk and interpret this as reflecting not only different credit risk 
premiums but also differences in borrower sophistication and negotiation ability. 
In our context, all applicants use by definition the same channel to compare offers from different lenders. 
In that setup, if in the extreme all banks followed exactly the same rules, a household might as well just 
talk to any single bank rather than paying to obtain multiple responses. A priori this is more likely for 
applications that according to the usually considered measures such as LTV and LTI ratios are safe and 
are thus likely to be attractive to all banks, whereas higher risks might still be attractive for some banks, 
e.g. when they are based on cantons whose house prices are historically less highly correlated with those 
in the banks’s home canton, but less attractive for others. On these grounds we posit: 
Hypothesis 4: We expect that spreads are more dispersed for households with higher LTV or LTI ratios 
than for households with lower LTV or LTI ratios. 
Having developed these hypotheses, let us now consider how to operationalize tests of them. 
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3 Data and Institutional Background 
3.1 Data Sources 
The key data used for our investigation stem from the Swiss website Comparis.ch. Between 2008 and 
2013, they operated a platform on which households could apply for mortgages and were then provided 
responses from several different banks. For reasons of data quality, we focus on 2010-13. The resulting 
data are unique and offer at least four advantages for our analysis. First, we separately observe demand 
and supply. Second, banks in their operation and we analyzing them can pin down the effects of banks’ 
differential access to clients from different regions based on amongst others pre-existing branch 
networks. Third, we can rule out that different banks tend to interact with different types of clients. And 
fourth, we observe 100% of the information each bank also has on each client. Bank decisions cannot 
be based on prior personal interaction, so our analyses cannot be biased by the use of soft information. 
Observations on how different banks respond to the same client have to the best of our knowledge until 
recently been achieved only in research on lending to corporates, such as Jimenez et al (2012) and 
Jimenez et al (2014). By contrast, households engaged in mortgage borrowing have not been observed 
to interact with several different banks. Yet Jordà et al (2016) and other papers have shown forcefully 
the importance of the key role of mortgage markets in causing banking, financial and general economic 
crises, given that mortgages tend to be the largest financial liability of most households as well as the 
largest class of assets for many banks. To our knowledge the first paper to observe how different banks 
respond to the same mortgage borrower is Basten (forthcoming) who uses the same Comparis data as 
we do here to analyse how banks have responded to Basel III counter-cyclical capital requirements. 
For the present purpose, the data include two outcomes of interest. First, an indicator of whether a 
specific bank makes an offer to a specific client. Second, given that it does, the rate offered. Offers can 
consist of between 1 and 3 tranches of different amounts, which may differ in the rate fixation period as 
well as in the offered interest rate. For each tranche, we subtract from the offered mortgage rate the swap 
rate for the same fixation period applicable on the day of the offer, as available through Bloomberg. 
This is to reflect the bank’s refinancing costs absent any maturity transformation and is the measure of 
refinancing costs commonly used in the market under study, see also Basten (forthcoming) and Basten 
and Mariathasan (2017). Finally, we compute the weighted average across the up to three tranches, with 
weights given by the fractions of the total mortgage amount attributable to the respective tranche. Prices 
offered here are indeed a key dimension along which banks can influence how many mortgage contracts 
they conclude each period. Thus Basten (forthcoming) shows, using the same data, how banks more 
affected by higher capital requirements increase offered mortgage rates more and thereafter end up with 
lower growth rates in their mortgage volumes. As we know each bank’s name, we complement the 
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Comparis data with data from banks’ annual reports on their total assets, mortgages over total assets, 
deposits over total assets, and capitalization. 
Furthermore we add data on actual house price growth by region from Fahrländer Partner Real Estate 
(FPRE). Together with Wüest & Partner and IAZI, FPRE is the leading Swiss real estate consulting 
company who, amongst other services, provides hedonic models that allow banks to gauge whether the 
market price a mortgage borrower wishes to pay is deemed appropriate. On the basis of the same hedonic 
quality adjustments they also compute house price indices for different quality segments from which we 
compute year-on-year house price growth rates. Furthermore, FPRE also estimates the extent to which 
current average house prices are “over-heated” in the sense of exceeding those prices deemed sustainable 
on the grounds of fundamental factors like incomes, rents and population growth (FPRE and BAK Basel, 
2009). Banks who are clients of FPRE or at least read their publications will be aware of their estimates 
explicitly, those who are not may be using other measures which are likely at least positively correlated 
with the FPRE estimates of over-heating. For our analyses, we lag both measures by one year to ensure 
the current figure can be known to all banks when making their decisions.2 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Overall we start with 6’914 applications, which attract a total of 25’125 responses. 20’583 of these are 
offers and 4’542 rejections. Table 1 shows the corresponding Summary Statistics. To provide a picture 
that corresponds as closely as possible to the data used for the subsequent regressions, the summary 
statistics use the same number of observations as the regressions. Thus Panel (A), which focuses on the 
key characteristics of the mortgage applications, assigns more weight to applications that received more 
responses. The number of responses varies between 1 (in 1.53% of cases) and 10 (in 0.04% of cases). 
Most applications received between 3 and 6 responses, the average application about 4 responses. The 
mortgage amount applied for, and which by design could not be adjusted by the responding banks, varied 
between CHF 100’000 and CHF 2’000’000, with an average value of about CHF 600’000. The LTV 
ratio varied between 15% and 90%, with an average value of about 65%. Here the maximum is shaped 
by the fact that for any mortgage violating the self-regulatory requirement of at least 10% of “hard 
equity” from the household, the bank willing to provide it would have faced a regulatory risk weight of 
100% instead of on average about 40%. The Loan-to-Income (LTI) ratio varied between 0.69 and 9.62, 
with a mean of  3.59. Household income varied between CHF 48’000 and 600’000, with an average of 
                                                     
2 We focus here on the measure for apartments. FPRE computes an analogous measure for single family homes (SFH), which 
yields very similar results in our regressions. 
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close to CHF 170’000, wealth including pension fund wealth reached an average close to CHF 500’000, 
and average age was 46 years. 
Next, Panel (B) gives the key regional characteristics. Average actual house prices across the 106 
statistical regions and during our sample period were considered to amount to between 94% and 200% 
of sustainable prices by FPRE, with a mean of 130% reflecting the wide-spread perception that house 
prices were due to correct downward somewhat at some point, as reflected also in opinions by, amongst 
others, SNB (2013) or FINMA (2014). This deemed over-heating is the result of price growth since the 
mid-1990s, which during our sample period reached on average 4.79% p.a. for apartments and 4.07% 
for single-family homes (SFH). In that context, we observe between 4 and 14 different banks offering 
mortgages online through the Comparis platform in a canton. Offline, we observe that the intensity of 
competition in cantonal mortgage markets is characterized by Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) 
values ranging between 0.12 and 0.29, and Multi-Market Contact (MMC) measures ranging between 
0.05 and 0.40. 
Looking at bank characteristics in Panel (C), where banks are again weighted by the number of 
responses sent out, total assets (TA) range between CHF 434 million and CHF 37.8 billion, with an 
average of 16.9 billion. Between about 40% and 91% of these, and on average 70% of them are invested 
in mortgages, which reflects the general focus of Swiss retail banks on mortgage lending, see also Basten 
and Mariathasan (2018). On the liability side, the most important position for most banks are deposits, 
with a range between about 17% and 66% and an average size of 48%. The capital ratio ranged between 
4.72% and 11.33% and averaged 7.25% of total assets. When sending out their responses, banks had 
accumulated experience with answering mortgage applications online through Comparis.ch for between 
0 and 69 months. The maximum is reached for responses submitted in the last months of our sample, 
September or October 2013, by banks participating since the platform start in early 2008. The average 
response in the sample is sent out by banks that at that point in time had a bit over 34 months or close 
to 3 years of experience of bidding for mortgages through Comparis.ch. 
Panel (D) finally gives the key characteristics of banks’ responses. To start with, it shows that the 
average response was sent to a household located between 0 and 422km or 0 and 4.42 hours from the 
bank. Given this geographical setup, the average household receives a bit over four different responses. 
On average this takes about 97 hours or about 4 days, although a bit over half of all responses arrive 
already within 48 hours. About 82% of all responses are offers. The rate fixation period ranges between 
0.25 years for mortgages where the rate adjusts to the CHF Libor interbank rate every 3 months and 10 
years. The average of 7.4 years reflects that 10 years is the most common fixation period, as discussed 
in more detail in Basten et al (2017). The average rate offered amounts to 2.16%, which implies an 
average spread above the swap rate for the same fixation period of 0.90% or 90 basis points (bps). Yet 
the spread varies between 40 and 152 bps, so banks’ eagerness to win a deal varies significantly. 
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4.3 Representativeness 
An important question when analyzing data from online lending is how representative these are of the 
offline market. To analyze this, we start with the key risk characteristics of the households. The best 
available benchmark for this is SNB (2014). Based on a bank survey that covers the 25 largest mortgage 
lenders and thereby 80% of the market, it reports that 7% of mortgages start with an LTV value above 
80%, which corresponds very closely to the value of 8% in our sample. Furthermore, they report 18% 
of households starting with a Payment to Income (PTI) ratio above 33%, where the annual payment is 
computed as 5% of the loan for interest plus 1% for amortization plus 1% of the loan for house 
maintenance. When we multiply our LTI ratios with 0.07, we find that 17% of households start out with 
a PTI ratio in excess of 1/3. While we cannot formally compare the two percentages with a t-test for 
lack of data on standard deviations in the SNB data, the differences of 1 percentage point each suggest 
that from the household side the Comparis data are overall representative of the offline market, featuring 
neither a flight of particularly risky households from offline to online lending nor a particular eagerness 
by particularly safe households to obtain better conditions online.  
Next and at least as important given the focus of this paper on geography, Table A1 presents the 
distribution of all 6’920 mortgage applications submitted between 2010 and 2013 across the 26 cantons, 
in Column (1) in terms of absolute numbers and in Column (2) in percent. In Column (3) it then 
compares that distribution with the percentage of new mortgage borrowers in the Swiss Household Panel 
(SHP) by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics stemming from each of the 26 cantons. A new mortgage 
borrower is defined as a household who first transitions from renter to home owner in 2008-133 and 
therefore has mortgage debt in 2014. Finally, Column (4) presents the distribution of cantons of all 
existing mortgages on bank balance sheets as of 2013. Overall, we find that the distribution of 
applications is quite representative of the market as a whole and is not for example biased toward more 
urban areas or toward any of Switzerland’s four language regions. 
Likewise, Table A2 contrasts the geographical distribution of the headquarters of the 27 banks in our 
sample with that of the universe of Swiss retail banks used in Basten and Mariathasan (2018). That 
paper starts out from the universe of all Swiss banks and then zooms in on the 50 retail banks by 
following the supervisor’s definition of a retail bank as one that earns at least 55% of its income either 
as net interest income or as loan fees. Of course the distribution of banks is less smooth in our sample 
than that of households given only 27 banks in total. Yet we observe that the sample includes banks 
from across the country with greater numbers of banks stemming from the most populated cantons 
Zurich, St. Gallen and Berne as well as Aargau and Basel. But it includes also representatives from 
                                                     
3 We start in 2008 to make the distribution sufficiently representative. 
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French-speaking Geneva, Valais and Vaud, as well as from Italian-speaking Ticino. Overall this makes 
us confident that the findings presented below are representative of bank behavior across all of 
Switzerland. Given the extreme heterogeneity of Switzerland in terms of language, religion, topography 
and urbanization, it may furthermore be argued that despite the limited size of the country, behavior is 
also representative of that in larger countries. 
Finally, Table A3 looks beyond geography. Panel A compares the characteristics of households in our 
sample to those of households in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) who recently acquired real estate. 
Panel B compares mortgage risk characteristics in our sample to those reported in the SNB Financial 
Stability Report 2014. Panel C finally compares the key characteristics of banks in our sample to those 
reported for all retail banks in Basten and Mariathasan (2018). In all three cases, we report all 
characteristics that are available both in our sample and reported in the respective benchmark. Column 
(1) always reports the mean value, and in brackets the standard error, in our sample, and Column (2) 
those in the benchmark—except for Panel B as SNB (2014) does not report standard errors. Panel A 
thus shows that households in our sample have virtually the same average age, but a higher household 
income. While the difference is not significant statistically, we deem it is significant economically. We 
do not see any obvious way in which this would distort the results of our bank-focused analyses, yet this 
difference is to be kept in mind. With regard to mortgage riskiness, we find no relevant difference with 
respect to payment-to-income (PTI) ratios and the resulting affordability of mortgages. By contrast, the 
fraction of mortgages with an LTV ratio in excess of 80% in our sample is economically lower at 7% 
than the 16% reported by the SNB. While the picture on this is incomplete as SNB (2014) does 
unfortunately report only this dummy rather than the continuous LTV measure and does not report 
corresponding standard errors, we may yet take the difference to suggest that our mortgage applications 
are if anything less risky. This makes sense, since it is known that in the more standardized online 
business banks will if anything be less willing to accept very high LTV ratios. As we explain later, this 
is indeed what we find in terms of bank risk-taking, and apparently households have to some extent 
anticipated this in that the fraction of applications with LTV ratios above 80% is smaller. Finally, Panel 
C shows that banks in our sample have a very similar risk-weighted capital ratio, but tend to be somewhat 
smaller and more deposit-financed. This likely reflects the fact that for larger banks it is more easily 
worthwhile starting their own online platform for mortgage lending or expanding their offline branch 
network, whereas the Comparis online platform is particularly attractive for smaller banks. 
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4 Empirical Strategy 
We organize our analyses around the areas covered in our hypothesis section above: competition, risk 
management, and automation, as well as the dispersion of offers within each household. Each regression 
table focuses on a specific (set of) regressor(s) of primary interest, but for comparability we seek to 
alternate whenever possible the same set of controls. Thus in each table Columns 1 and 2 for the 
outcomes offer and pricing respectively control only for household characteristics, while Columns 3 and 
4 add key bank characteristics. Columns 5 and 6 replace bank characteristics with bank fixed effects. 
Finally, Columns 7 and 8 replace household controls with household fixed effects, except for Table 2 
where the main regressors of interest do not vary within each household, so that no household fixed 
effects and hence no Columns 7 and 8 are added.  
In addition to all regressors displayed and discussed, regressions include year*month fixed effects to 
fully control for any time trends. Furthermore, we cluster standard errors by application. This yields 
6’920 clusters, the size of which ranges from 1 to 10, has a mean of 4.2 and a SD of 1.4. So cluster sizes 
differ somewhat but not excessively so. It does not make sense to cluster by bank given that the data set 
includes only 26 banks. As a robustness check, we have clustered by bank*year and found results to be 
robust to doing so. However, we cluster by application in our baseline, for otherwise the cluster size 
would range from 2 to 2’500 and its SD of 800 would amount to more than half of the mean of 1’400. 
Alternative specifications in which standard errors are robust but not clustered also produce very similar 
results. That said, the following subsections add a few relevant details on our approach to each of the 
three areas of analysis. 
4.1 Strategy on Competition 
We start with the online market only and measure the intensity of competition there with the number of 
other banks also offering to applicants from the same canton. After that we broaden the focus to the 
entire mortgage market, including its larger offline fraction. We measure the intensity of offline 
competition primarily with the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). It would take value 1 
if a single monopolist held the entire market, whereas it approaches zero when market shares are 
distributed more or less equally among an increasing number of competitors. In the case of Swiss 
cantonal mortgage markets, it ranges between 0.12 at the lower end and 0.49 at the upper end, and has 
an average value of 0.19. The deviation from zero is driven to a significant extent by typically significant 
market shares of the local cantonal banks that exist in 24 of the 26 cantons. For data reasons, the HHI 
measure we use focuses on mortgage market shares only and does not explicitly capture shares in the 
markets for transactions, deposits or advisory services. As these other banking services are often sold 
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together with mortgages, market shares in the other businesses can be expected to be highly correlated 
with the mortgage market HHI.  
For robustness, we alternatively use the Multi-Market Contact (MMC) index as in Degryse and Ongena 
(2007). It is based on Hypothesis 1c, following Edwards’ (1955) idea of a “linked oligopoly” under 
which multi-market contact increases banks’ incentives to collude and hence leads them to behave less 
competitively. On the other hand though, Park and Penacchi (2008) find that the presence of more multi-
market banks can promote more competitive behavior. So we need to look at the data to find out. Either 
way, the MMC measure for each canton sums the number of bank pairs present after weighting each 
pair by the number of other cantons in which this pair does also encounter each other. More formally, 
we denote the 26 cantons by indicator j, and the 180 banks with any mortgages in 2009 by indicators k 
and l. Then we let Dij =1 if bank i operates in canton j and 0 otherwise. So 𝑎𝑘𝑙 = ∑ 𝐷𝑘𝑗𝐷𝑙𝑗26𝑗=1  tells us 
for each pair of banks (k,l) in how many of the 26 cantons they encounter each other, and fj indicates 
how many pairs of banks we encounter in canton j. Based on this, we compute 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝑗 =226𝑓𝑗(𝑓𝑗−1)∑ ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑙𝐷𝑘𝑗𝐷𝑙𝑗180𝑙=𝑘+1180𝑘=1 . Overall the resulting MMC measure ranges between 4.6% and 40.5% 
and reaches an average of 7.5%. 
As both HHI and MMC index could potentially be correlated with the extent to which mortgage lending 
and house price levels have been growing in recent years, both tables control in addition to all household 
and bank characteristics also for year-on-year apartment price growth as well as year-on-year single-
family-home (SFH) price growth in the year preceding the bank response of interest. 
4.2 Strategy on Regional Diversification 
After Table 2 has analyzed how the online channel affects the role of competition in mortgage lending, 
Tables 3 explores the effects of the internet channel on bank risk management. We start with driving 
distance between the bank’s headquarters and the postcode area of the applicant. In alternative 
specifications available on request we used instead driving time, which in mountainous territory differs 
in some cases, but is highly enough correlated with distance that it yields qualitatively the same 
regression results. Following that, we look at the extent to which year-on-year house price changes in 
the applicant’s canton have historically been correlated with those in the bank’s home canton. Finally, 
we consider the extent to which prices in the applicant’s canton are deemed over-heated relative to the 
extent to which this is the case in the bank’s home canton.  
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4.3 Strategy on Automation vs. Discretion 
Following analyses on both competition and risk management, we explore to what extent the responses 
to the factors discussed above are automated, to what extent we observe prices to fluctuate around the 
values predicted by these factors, and whether this extent differs between different types of responses. 
To do so, we implement regression models with multiplicative heteroscedasticity as introduced by 
Harvey (1976). In a two-step procedure, he suggests to first estimate the relationship between regressors 
and outcomes of interest, in our context regressing offered spreads on competition intensity and regional 
characteristics as explained above. In a second step, we can then compute for each observation the 
residual variation ui2 not explained by our model and regress its log on our regressors of interest. In our 
case, we start with the full set of household and bank characteristics used also in the analyses discussed 
above, and add indicators for whether the applicant wishes to finance a single-family home (SFH) or a 
less standard type of real estate (villa, multi-family-home, or holiday home) rather than an apartment. 
Following that, we look first at the same three measures of competition as in Table 2 and then at the 
same three measures of relative riskiness as in Table 3. Following that, we analyze in addition how the 
extent of discretion relates respectively to how fast the response was sent, and to the number of months 
for which the bank has already been offering mortgages online.4  
4.4 Strategy to Analyze the Dispersion of Offers within each Household 
As we observe responses from multiple banks to each application, another dimension of interest is to 
what extent responses are similar and to what extent they differ. Each application receives between 1 
and 10 and on average a bit over 4 responses. When we rank the first 7 responses, given that receiving 
8 or 9 is rare, in ascending order by spread, average spreads are respectively 79bps, 90bps, 95bps, 99bps, 
103bps, 107bps, 108bps. Gurun et al (2016) measure dispersion as the difference between the 95th and 
5th percentiles of “mortgage expensiveness”, defined as the residual a borrower pays relative to the mean 
price paid by a borrower with the same characteristics. As we focus on offers sent to literarally the same 
household, we observe only 2-4 offers for many households so that inter-percentile differences would 
arguably be too much driven by outliers. Therefore we follow instead Bhutta et al (2019) and measure 
dispersion as the standard deviation of prices each household receives. For Table 5, we thus compute 
for each household the SD of spreads in basis points, as well as the SD in percent of the mean spread, 
and analyze which application characteristics this varies with. 
                                                     
4 Following Harvey (1976), we practically implement the estimates by Maximum Likelihood Estimation rather than by two-
step estimation, to improve estimator efficiency. 
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4.5 Strategy to Further Probe the Robustness of our Results 
As discussed above, all our tables widely vary the set of controls. Except for our analyses on 
competition, they include also variations that control even for household fixed effects and bank fixed 
effects, something not possible in more traditional setups where only one mortgage lender is observed 
for each mortgage borrower. Further, all specifications control flexibly for time trends by way of 
year*month fixed effects. We also probe the robustness to different ways of computing standard errors. 
All that said, results on pricing up to this point could potentially be affected by potential biases from the 
fact that pricing is observed only conditional on the bank making an offer at all. Basten (forthcoming) 
focused specifically on the effects of new capital requirements, observed no response of offer 
propensities to them and could therefore analyze responses of pricing to the requirements without having 
to account for possible selectiveness of responses. But here we are interested in a wide variety of 
independent variables and our results below show that offer propensities do respond to some of them.  
A priori we expect that either banks express their eagerness to lend to any given applicant exclusively 
through rationing (rejecting) or pricing, in which case we can analyze the two dimensions separately as 
in Basten (forthcoming), or that they use both margins of response to express the same preferences. In 
the latter case, less attractive applications should typically be more likely to be rejected and receive 
higher prices conditional on not being rejected. Price add-ons observed should then typically be a bit 
muted relative to those we would have observed if banks had had exclusively the pricing tool at hands. 
One may argue that offers which were not made influence neither the intensity of competition nor banks’ 
risk management, so that offers never made do not bias the coefficients of interest anyway. Yet for 
completeness we are interested in understanding whether selectiveness of offers affects coefficients in 
our pricing regressions. Hence, following Heckman (1979), we estimate a selection equation in which 
we regress an indicator for observing an offer on our regressors of interest plus a variable that does 
plausibly affect offer propensities but not pricing (exclusion restriction). Following that, our outcome 
equation repeats our pricing estimations but controls for the estimated propensity of observing an offer. 
For the variable that plausibly affects offer propensities but not pricing, we use an indicator for whether 
an application and the resulting response are sent out in the second rather than the first half of a calendar 
year. This is based on the idea that many banks may set annual targets for their overall volume of 
mortgage lending and deny more often when upon receiving an application they are already closer to or 
even beyond reaching their annual target. By contrast, offered prices are arguably chosen with reference 
to prevailing refinancing costs, credit risks, and competition, which need not differ significantly between 
the first and second half of the year. While we cannot formally test whether the month of the year does 
really not affect pricing, the approach can yet give us some confidence that offers never made would not 
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have yielded very different effects on the pricing than the offers actually made and covered in our 
baseline analyses. 
These analyses are always based on explicitly sent offers and rejections. However, not all 26 banks do 
send an explicit response to all applications. Instead, some banks have pre-specified with the platform 
operator what type of applications they wish to be forwarded and respond to. For example one bank may 
prefer mortgage amounts up to CHF 1 million, while another may prefer only larger ones, or one bank 
may prefer to finance only apartments, while another is happy to finance also single-family homes. As 
we do not know the exact agreements on this, one potential concern is that the set of applications a bank 
chooses to respond to is correlated with another regressor of interest so that our estimates could be biased 
by another source of selectiveness here. To investigate this, we fill in the dataset to include all possible 
household bank combinations. Then we repeat our Heckman analyses treating any non-response in the 
same way as an explicit rejection. As our results turn out to be robust to both sets of Heckman analyses, 
we now present our results on the simpler specifications that do not account for possible selectiveness, 
and discuss our Heckman analyses in more detail only after that.  
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5 Results 
Table 2 presents our results on Competition, Table 3 those on risk management through the geographical 
allocation of mortgage lending, and Table 4 on the extent to which banks’ choices are automated. In 
addition, Table 5 analyses in addition which types of applications attract a more diverse set of responses. 
Following that, Table 6 shows how results differ when we consider also offers never made amongst our 
actual set of responses, while Table 7 considers even bank-household responses never sent. Finally, 
Tables A1-3 explore how representative the dataset is of the offline market. 
In Table 2 and Table 3, uneven column numbers show the results for the binary outcome offer vs. 
rejection using logit regressions on all 25’125  responses. Equal column numbers then show those for 
the continuous outcome pricing using OLS regressions. Offered prices are observed only for the 20’583 
responses that are offers, which is why Table 6 and Table 7 explore whether pricing results are robust 
to accounting for possible selectiveness of price observations. 
In Table 2 and Table 3 we always show the regressors of specific interest in those tables at the top, 
followed first by key household characteristics and then by key bank characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 
start controlling for household characteristics only, while Columns 3 and 4 add also bank characteristics. 
Columns 5 and 6 replace bank characteristics with bank fixed effects. Finally, Columns 7 and 8 replace 
household characteristics with household fixed effects, except for Table 2 where the main regressor of 
interest does not vary within households, so no household fixed effects are possible. 
For household characteristics we focus on indicators for LTV ratios above 67% and 80% and loan-to-
income (LTI) ratios above 4.5 and 5.5 respectively. The specific threshold values reflect frequent 
practice in the market5 and for LTV ratios reflect also those thresholds above which Swiss banks 
following the Basel Standardized Approach (all banks in our sample) face higher risk weights leading 
to higher capital requirements and therefore higher refinancing costs (see Basten, forthcoming). The 
threshold indicators turn out to have stronger effects on the outcomes of interest than continuous LTV 
or LTI variables. In robustness checks available on request continuous LTV and LTI ratios fail to have 
a statistically significant effect on our outcomes of interest after controlling for the indicators displayed 
here. Furthermore, in line with common practice at the banks studied, we focus on the two risk 
characteristics LTV and LTI. When we additionally control for a household’s total income, rental 
                                                     
5 In partcular, banks deem applicants more risky if their Payment-to-Income (PTI) ratio exceeds 1/3. For 
computing the PTI ratio during the period analyzed, banks used «stress-test» interest rates of either 4.5% or 
5%. In addition they assumed house maintenance costs amounting to either 1% of the loan value, or 1% of the 
house value, implying 1.5% of the loan value at an LTV ratio of 2/3. Finally, amortization was assumed to be 
either 1% of the loan value, or 0% when regulation did not require it due to an initial LTV ratio <= 2/3, or before 
June 2012. Overall the 9 resulting combinations implied annual mortgage service payments ranging between 
5.5% and 7.65% of the loan. The requirement for this to not exceed 1/3 was then equivalent to LTI thresholds 
of between 4.36 and 6.06. Here we round these to 4.5 and 5.5, as these are LTI values used in regulation in 
other countries, such as the UK. Other, similar LTI values yield the same regression results.   
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income or non-labor income, for the household’s wealth (including pension fund wealth), debt, age or 
the type of dwelling sought, which are also observed in addition to LTV and LTI, none of them changes 
significantly the coefficients on the regressors displayed here.   
As one would expect, we find throughout that higher LTV or LTI ratios induce banks to offer less often 
and, conditional on still offering, to add a risk premium and therefore charge higher prices. This is in 
line with, amongst others, Campbell and Cocco (2015), who point out how higher LTV ratios tend to be 
associated with higher credit risk in mortgage lending. Furthermore, the about 50% of applications 
asking for banks to refinance their mortgage, rather than to finance their initial purchase, tend to receive 
better prices conditional on receiving an offer, even after controlling for the meanwhile typically lower 
LTV ratio and possibly higher incomes. This can be explained by the fact that household seeking a 
refinancing has already had his real estate screened and approved at least once by another bank and 
furthermore will have been servicing the mortgage already for a while. Table 3 also finds that banks 
make an offer less often, and conditional on making require an extra risk premium for households from 
areas that have had higher house price growth in the preceding year, increasing downward potential. 
When we focus instead on bank characteristics, we see that banks which are either larger in terms of 
total assets or have a larger fraction of their assets dedicated to mortgage lending offer more often and 
at more competitive prices. One plausible explanation of this finding, beyond risk management, is a 
higher operational efficiency. By contrast, banks that raise a larger fraction of their funding through 
deposits offer less often. Here one possible reason is that having more depositors provides a bank already 
with a larger pool of potential mortgage clients, so that it depends less on selling mortgages also through 
the online channel. Another is that in contrast to the second most important source of funding for Swiss 
commercial banks, covered bonds, deposits are typically thought to have shorter effective rate fixation 
periods. Thus financing mortgages – the majority of which carries fixed rates – with deposits tends to 
yield a profitable margin in the short run, but implies also more interest rate risk to be borne, or hedged 
at a cost. Finally, banks that are better capitalized tend to charge higher prices, possibly reflecting the 
fact that a larger fraction of funding raised through equity is typically thought to imply (more bank safety 
in crisis times but also) higher marginal costs for each unit of lending. After this general discussion on 
the effects of our main control variables, demonstrating the validity of our setup, let us now turn to our 
key regressors of interest. 
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5.1 Results on Competition 
Table 2 looks at banks’ responses to the intensity of mortgage supply competition in the canton of the 
applying household. Line 1 focuses on the most obviously relevant measure of competition, the total 
number of banks also bidding for mortgages in the applicant’s canton through the Comparis platform. 
We find that with each additional online competitor the offer propensity increases by one percentage 
point and prices are 1bp lower, so that an increase from the lowest number of competitors, 4, to the 
largest number, 11, increases each responding bank’s offer propensity by about 11 percentage points 
and lowers prices by about 11bps. This may not sound large for raw interest rates, but is arguably 
economically significant when considering that it is the difference in rates after fully adjusting for the 
rate fixation period (maturity), credit risk and other household characteristics, and key bank 
characteristics such as size or capitalization. Overall, we see this as confirming our Hypothesis 1a, 
whereby more online competition provides borrowers with more and better offers. 
In the row below, we see that even after controlling for online competition, banks offer between 11 and 
20% more often to a market that is hitherto characterized by a monopoly (HHI=1) than to a market 
hitherto characterized by maximally intensive competition (HHI=0), and conditional on making such an 
offer lower prices by between 36 and 46bps. This implies that 1 SD in HHI of 0.05 units raises the offer 
propensity by up to 1% and lowers prices by up to 2.3bps. This confirms our Hypothesis 1b, whereby 
banks will seize the online channel to enter in particular those regional markets where offline 
competition has so far been less pronounced and which they may hence expect to be more profitable 
also for possible follow-up business. Consistent with this idea is the finding that banks tend to slightly 
increase prices the longer they have been offering online mortgages to a canton, as evidenced by the 
positive coefficients on a bank’s online experience. 
Finally, the same Table 2 adds in the third line also the MMC measure and finds that banks offer lower 
prices the more they face in that canton banks whom they encounter also elsewhere. Put differently, they 
respond to more multi-market contact in qualitatively the same way as to higher market concentration 
measured by the HHI, which is in line with the original “linked oligopoly” hypothesis by Edwards 
(1955) rather than with the findings of Park and Penacchi (2008) or those of Degryse and Ongena (2007) 
who find higher MMC values to affect banking in the direction opposite that of higher HHI values. 
5.2 Results on Regional Diversification 
As discussed in our hypothesis section above, the internet allows banks to more freely choose which 
regions to lend to on the basis of different intensities of competition, but also in view of differences in 
credit risk. Typically the further away from the bank a household is located, the less has the bank already 
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lent in his area, which makes the area on the one hand a potentially useful addition to its portfolio, but 
on the other hand implies that the bank might lack relevant local information. On these grounds, our 
Table 3 starts off by exploring how banks respond specifically to distance. While results on offer 
propensities are less clear than in a version that does not include price correlation and relative over-
heating at the same time, Columns 4, 6 and 8 show that as soon as we keep bank characteristics fixed 
either through controls or through bank fixed effects, banks lower the offer price by between 1 and 3bps 
for each 100km of distance. Results are qualitatively the same when we replace driving distance in 
100km with driving time in hours, available on request. Overall this confirms our Hypothesis 2a. 6 7 
While distance is merely a proxy for the marginal contribution of an extra mortgage to credit risk in the 
bank’s portfolio, relative price over-heating measures credit risk more directly. In a period in which 
collateral values appear somewhat over-heated in most to all regions following a prolonged period of 
historically low interest rates, a bank may not be able to entirely avoid lending to a region deemed over-
heated, if it does not wish to entirely close down its mortgage business. But it may at least want to 
consider how over-heated collateral values in the applicant’s region are deemed to be relative to those 
in its home region to which it has easier client access also without the internet channel analyzed here. 
We find that where prices are over-heated by 1 SD or about 17% more than in the bank’s home canton, 
banks make up to 4.25% fewer offers. In line with this, offered prices are up to 4.93 (17%*29bps) higher. 
These findings confirm Hypothesis 2b. They show that, even after controlling for distance, banks do 
consider over-heating risks, as measured either by the FPRE measure we used here or another one 
sufficiently correlated with it, when choosing how they would like to geographically allocate their 
mortgage portfolio given the opportunity to choose without reference to their pre-existing branches. 
However, what if predictions of relative price over-heating in different cantons turn out to prove wrong 
and those cantons where prices were thought less over-heated experience the largest price decreases and 
highest default rates? One way to tackle this risk is for a bank to diversify its portfolio across regions 
where prices are likely to develop differently, thus reducing their overall losses regardless of which 
region experiences larger and which one smaller price reductions. To analyze to what extent banks seek 
to do so, line 3 adds as a regressor the correlation between year-on-year house price growth in the 
applicant’s region and that in the bank’s home region (where banks typically have the largest share of 
their pre-existing mortgage portfolios). Past correlations are based on year-on-year growth rates in a 
house price index for medium-quality apartment prices since 1985 from FPRE consultants, but growth 
                                                     
6 Computed with the same GIS program, distance and time do despite sometimes mountainous geography exhibit a 
correlation of 0.99. Therefore a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tells us that we may regress offer indicators and offered 
spreads on either, but not on both at the same time. 
7 In line with these findings, additional regressions confirm also more explicitly that banks offer specifically lower prices the 
more their pre-existing mortgage portfolio is «under-represented» in a canton, i.e. the more that canton’s share in the bank’s 
mortgage portfolio falls short of that of the entire Swiss banking system. 
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rates on low or high quality apartments or single-family homes yield very similar regression results. 
These correlations are all positive: Within a country as small as Switzerland that is subject to the same 
monetary policy it is hard to find a region whose house prices can be expected to increase when those 
elsewhere decrease. Yet despite a common monetary policy the summary statistics show that as different 
cantons specialize in different economic sectors and tend to receive their majority of net immigrants 
from different countries, some inter-cantonal correlations are as low as 0.15, which does provide a good 
degree of diversification. This said, Line 3 shows that when responding to a canton whose house price 
growth exhibits a one standard deviation or 0.19 units lower correlation with the bank’s home canton, 
banks’ offer propensity is between 0.95% (Column 3) and 2.09% (Column 1) higher, and conditional 
on making an offer prices are up to 1.71bps (Column 2) lower. Overall we take this to confirm 
Hypothesis 2c and see some potential here for banks to indeed improve the diversification of their 
mortgage portfolios as the online channel allows them to regions not easily reached offline. 
Overall, our findings on the effects of distance, relative house price over-heating, and inter-cantonal 
house price growth correlations – as well as additional findings on the role of whether a canton’s share 
in a bank’s existing mortgage portfolio falls short of that in the portfolio of the entire Swiss banking 
system — suggest that in a market where soft information is not present or important, banks can and do 
use the internet channel foremost to improve the diversification of their lending portfolio. 
5.3 Results on Automation vs. Discretion 
After exploiting extensively how banks’ offering and pricing vary with competition and risk 
management considerations, the question arises to what extent outcome variation remains unexplained 
by these factors and whether that extent does again vary systematically, i.e. whether we have 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity of standard errors as formalized in Harvey (1976). 
In that vein, Table 4 shows in Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 the results of the mean equation regressing offered 
spreads on different sets of regressors. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 then show the results of estimating the 
corresponding variance equation. It takes the log of the outcome variance unexplained in the mean 
equation and regresses it on independent variables of interest. To start with, we see here that Column 7 
with its 20’583 observations and 12 regressors reaches an R2 of about 22%, and Columns 1, 3 and 5 
which control for year*month fixed effects reach one of even 27-28%. This is significantly higher than 
for example in Petersen and Rajan (2002), where the R2 from analyzing what determines interest rates 
on business loans reaches merely 17-18%. The likely reason is that they analyze lending to small 
businesses, in which loan officers take into account a good deal of soft information, whereas in the setup 
analyzed here banks have only the hard information we have as well. 
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Nonetheless, our R2 is by no means close to 100%. In fact, our Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 show that the 
amount of rate variation which our model cannot explain does vary systematically with a number of 
regressors of interest. Starting with household characteristics, we find throughout all 7 columns that 
when the applicant’s LTV ratio exceeds two-thirds, then the squared residual increases by 38-46% and 
hence the standard deviation of prices offered increases by 6.2-6.8%. While low-LTV applications may 
be dealt with by more junior staff following set rules, or may even be delegated to a computer, the higher 
the LTV ratio and hence the higher the estimated credit risk the more often does the decision have to be 
escalated to more senior staff, under whom our set of standard regressors need not always have the same 
marginal effects. Relatedly, we observe that the squared residual increases by 16-26%, and hence the 
residual by 4-5% whenever the proposed lending collateral is a less standardized object such as a villa, 
holiday home or multi-family house rather than more standard and hence easier-to-value apartments or 
single-family homes. This is consistent with the predictions in Petersen and Rajan (1995) whereby banks 
exert more discretion when lending to more “opaque” and hence harder-to-value firms. The findings 
support Hypothesis 3a. 
Looking at bank characteristics, we find that each percent increase in the responding bank’s total assets 
reduces the squared residual by between 8-20% and hence the residual by 2.8-4.5%, while each 
percentage point increase in a bank’s share of total assets allocated to mortgages reduces the squared 
residual by 2-3% and hence the residual by 1.4-1.7%. Both findings confirm our Hypothesis 3b, whereby 
larger or more mortgage-specialized banks have more previous observations to allow them devising 
more reliable rules, and have stronger incentives to invest fine-tuning such rules.  
Having thus analyzed the role of standard household and bank characteristics, we look next at the same 
measures of competition intensity and credit risk as analyzed above. Column 2 shows that more web 
competitors ceteris paribus lead banks not only to offer lower prices but also to automate their business 
more: Thus each extra web competitor is associated with a reduction of 6% in the squared residual and 
hence a reduction of 2.5% in the residual. Differences in HHI and MMC by contrast have no statistically 
significant effect on the amount of discretion after controlling for the number of web competitors. The 
finding for the number of web competitors however is consistent with predictions following from the 
work by Petersen and Rajan (1995).  
Next, Column 4 shows that for each extra 100km of distance, squared residuals decrease by 12 and 
standard deviations therefore by 3.5%, as presumably loan officers have less additional information 
about specific postcode areas that they feel useful to take into account and hence decide more rule-based 
than “closer to home”. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions by Hauswald and Marquez 
(2006) in which banks seek to soften price competition closer to home by acquiring more private 
information so that they can threaten competitors from outside to end up with adversely selected 
customers. By contrast, in more distant places it does not pay to acquire the same amount of information 
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to better select customers so that banks can only compete through lower prices (and might end up making 
less efficient lending decisions). In our context we can rule out the acquisition of private information at 
the level of individual households, as all banks have the same set of borrower-specific hard information 
and so do we. Some discretion may yet remain if a local bank draws different implications from 
observing the same postcode as a more distant bank. Column 4 also finds that for each percentage point 
for which regional house prices appear more over-heated, squared residuals increase by about 202% so 
that residuals increase by about 14%, the largest determinant of all so far. This is consistent with more 
discretion for higher-LTV applications, possibly implemented through internal rules that require 
decisions about riskier applications to be escalated to more senior staff. 
Then, Column 6 finds that whenever a  response is sent out in less than the median response time of 48 
hours, squared residuals decrease by 18% and residuals therefore by 4.2%. This is likely precisely why 
they can be sent out faster. Finally, Column 8 shows that with each additional month for which the bank 
has been offering mortgages online through the Comparis platform, squared residuals decrease by about 
2% and residuals therefore by 1.4%. Assuming as a simplified approximation that this marginal effect 
of each month of online experience is the same for all 69 months observed, this implies a decrease in 
discretion by more than 90% between the first and the last month of our sample. This can be seen to 
support Hypothesis 3c.  
5.4 Results on Disperson of Offers 
In Table 5, Columns 1 and 3 use as outcome the standard deviation of spreads within the set of responses 
received by each household, while Columns 2 and 4 use the same standard deviation but for robustness 
rescale it by the mean spread offerd to that household. Columns 1 and 2 control additionally for 
year*month fixed effects, while Columns 3 and 4 do not. As each household’s set of responses consists 
by definition of responses from multiple different banks, we cannot analyse how the dispersion of offers 
is related to e.g. distance or the correlation of prices in the hosehold’s and in the bank’s canton, but we 
can analyse firstly how it varies with the three measures of competition intensity in the applicant’s 
canton, and secoddly with applicant-specific risk factors. 
Starting with the coefficient on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), we find first that the standard 
deviation is on average about 26bps, or about 20% of the mean spread, lower in a (hypothetically) fully 
monopolized cantonal market. In a similar vein, we also find less dispersion the more other banks are 
also bidding online, although the size of this effect is below 1bp per additional competitor and therefore 
seems economically negligeable. By contrast, the effect of a more concentrated offline market does not, 
and suggests that most banks agree which cantons are most attractive to enter through the online channel. 
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By contrast, banks appear to agree less when the credit risk associated with a household is higher. In 
particular, we find that whenever the LTV ratio exceeds two-thirds, the SD of spreads is on average 
4bps, or about 3% of the mean spread offered to that household, higher. In line with that, it tends to be 
lower for refinancing applications, which tend not only to have already reduced their LTV ratios but 
have also proven already for a number of years that they are able and willing to keep servicing their 
mortgage as agreeds with their previous financing partner(s). We take this to confirm our Hypothesis 4. 
It can be attributed firstly to inter-bank differences in the ability and willingness to take on riskier clients, 
and secondly to the fact that borrowers with higher LTV ratios may still be more attractive for banks 
from further away so that house prices in their existing portfolio exhibit on average a lower correlation 
with those in the applicant’s canton, than for banks already concentrated in that canton. 
5.5 Robustness 
In Table 6 we explore how robust our effects on pricing are to controlling for possible selectiveness of 
where we observe an offer and hence a price in the first place. All columns control for bank fixed effects. 
Columns 3-8 control also for household fixed effects, while Columns 1 and 2 use instead household 
controls as the competition measures of interest there are invariant within each canton and therefore also 
within each household. More specifically, Columns 1-2 include the same three competition measures as 
in Table 2 and Columns 3-4 include the three risk measures as in Table 3. Columns 5-6 and 7-8 include 
respectively the fast response and bank web experience measures as in Table 4. Within these four pairs, 
the first column shows always the results of estimating the selection equation, which atop all other 
regressors includes the 2nd semester indicator. The second shows the resulting main equation estimates. 
To start with, results on the selection equation show that responses sent out in the second half of the 
year are between 8% (Column 1) and 11% (Column 11) less likely to be offers, so the instrument is 
certainly sufficiently strong. The exclusion restriction whereby pricing depends on the bank’s own 
refinancing costs, risks and competition intensity but not on the time of year can by definition not be 
tested formally, but month-dependent pricing after controlling for all other regressors seems unlikely. 
As discussed above, offer propensities vary significantly also with amongst others household 
characteristics, competition intensity, and risk characteristics, suggesting that the pricing on offers never 
sent could differ from that on offers that are sent out.  
The Inverse Mills Ratio, i.e. the product between the standard error of the residuals σ and the correlation 
ρ between the error terms of selection equation and outcome equation, is statistically significant at the 
1% significance level and has a size of 0.15 to 0.16. This suggests that the error terms of the two 
equations are indeed correlated significantly. All estimates displayed here control for bank fixed effects 
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and year*month fixed effects. Columns 3-8 control additionally for household fixed effects, while 1-2 
have to make do with the standard set of household controls, as household fixed effects would be 
perfectly collinear with the competition measures of interest, which do not vary within each household.  
Comparing the coefficients on our three measures of competition intensity with those in Table 2, we 
find the same coefficient discount per number of web competitors, a discount of 51 rather than 36-46 
bps when increasing the HHI from 0 to 1, and a discount of 35 rather than 41-64bps when increasing 
the MMC from 0 to 1. So while sizes differ, sign and statistical significance are qualitatively unchanged. 
We also find a discount of 5bps rather than -1 to +3bps per 100km distance, a surcharge of 52bps rather 
than 2-29bps when prices are twice as over-heated as in the bank’s home canton, whereas the MMC 
measure retains no statistically significant coefficient. Fast responses now cost 2bps more rather than 
1bp less than slow responses and with each month of bank web experience they increase by 1bp rather 
than decreasing by 2bps (Table 4). These two differences sem economically negligeable. 
Following these Heckman regressions on our baseline sample, Table 7 investigates also whether our 
estimates might be biased by bank-household combinations where banks send no response rather than 
an explicit rejection. We fill in all possible household-bank combinations and treat non-responses like 
rejections. This inflates the dataset from 25’125 responses or on average about 4 responses per 
application to up to 180’839 possible household bank combinations or up to 26 per bank. Associations 
with the “fast response” indicator cannot be analyzed here, as we cannot sensibly define whether a non-
response was “fast” or “slow”. Looking at the results on competition intensity in Column 2, the discount 
associated with an extra web competitor remains again unchanged, that associated with more offline 
market concentration increases even slightly further to 58bps, while that associated with more mult-
market contact decreases slightly to 32 bps. 
The discount per 100km of extra distance increases from 5 to 8bps, the surcharge for more correlation 
returns to the statistically significant 9bps as in Column 2 of Table 3, while now more relative price 
over-heating appears to induce a discount rather than a surcharge. The coeffient on web experience is 
unchanged from the smaller sample. 
Overall, we do note that some coefficients do change size when we account for either rejections or non-
responses, but overall results are largely confirmed. Thus we deem it appropriate to focus at the baseline 
on the pricing of offers actually sent out rather than the hypothetical pricing of offers never sent out. 
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6 Conclusion  
In this paper we have investigated how mortgage lending changes through the provision of an online 
platform where potential borrowers from across the country can apply and potential lenders from across 
the country can respond. For banks this removes the usual constraint that most banks can interact with 
most borrowers only if they maintain a branch nearby that borrower’s location. For us as researchers the 
platform, which has provided us with all borrower information as forwarded to the participating banks, 
allows to attribute a bank’s propensity to offer and the attractiveness of its offers directly to properties 
of the applicant’s region, and its relationship with the bank’s own location and prior portfolio. In 
particular, the fact that we observe the responses from different, and differently located, banks, as well 
as responses from each bank to different, and differently located, households, allows us to saturate most 
regressions with both household fixed effects (or characteristics) and bank fixed effects (or 
characteristics) and so to isolate the role of the location of each side and of their interaction. We thus 
obtain findings along three dimensions. 
First, we observe that the more other competitors are also offering online to a region the more often do 
banks respond with an offer and the more attractive is the price they offer. At the same time, we observe 
banks to bid more attractive prices in particular for applicants from regions with hitherto more 
concentrated offline markets, suggesting that they seize the online channel to get “a foot in the door” in 
those markets. For potential borrowers, in particular those located in hitherto less competitive regions, 
this implies that the availability of an online platform can lead to more and better mortgage offers. 
Second, in line with banks’ general strife to use the online channel to enter profitable markets, we see 
that the average bank makes particularly attractive offers when bidding for clients in regions further 
away from its “home turf”. In particular, they make more attractive offers also to regions where collateral 
prices are deemed less over-heated relative to those in the bank’s home region, or where in the past price 
changes have been less correlated with those in the bank’s home region. In that sense, the online channel 
allows banks to improve the inter-regional allocation of their mortgage portfolio and hence ceteris 
paribus improve their risk management in line with arguments in amongst others Quigly and Van Order 
(1991). We deem the risk management benefits from more inter-regional diversification to dominate 
potential increases in the cost of raising information on more regions, as validly raised by Loutskina and 
Strahan (2014), in the market analyzed. For collateral values here are assessed with the same hedonic 
models country-wide and information on borrowers are equally reliable regardless of the region. Yet we 
acknowledge that we cannot explicitly compare default rates on more versus less distant residential 
mortgage lending, as the period analyzed is characterized by a negligible incidence of defaults. 
Third, we investigate explicitly dispersion of offered prices around those predicted by the set of factors 
discussed above, and interpret it as cases in which decision-making is not fully automated or is even 
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escalated to more senior staff. As expected, we find more automation for safer loans, by larger banks, 
and by banks more specialized in mortgage lending. More interestingly, we also find that the degree of 
automation thus measured increases the longer the bank has been offering mortgages to individual 
customers through the online platform, suggesting that longer participation can help banks to reduce 
their operational costs. Importantly, absent a crisis we do not yet know for sure whether such automation 
increases the potential for erroneous decisions in the sense of under- (or over-) pricing underlying credit 
risk. We do however observe banks to price in all commonly considered mortgage risk factors such as 
LTV and LTI ratios, as well as estimates of regional house price over-heating, so we have no reason to 
suspect that banks are less careful when offering mortgages online than when they do so offline. 
Overall our findings suggest potential improvements for borrowers as well as for financial stability that 
can be achieved through online platforms, so it will be interesting to see how the use of platforms with 
associated costs and risks develops going forward. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
            
  N Mean SD Min Max 
(A) Applicant Characteristics           
Year 25'125 2011 1 2010 2013 
Month 25'125 6 3 1 12 
Mortgage Amount 25'125 566'274 332'695 100'000 2'000'000 
Refinancing (0/1) 25'125 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) 25'125 64.50 17.30 15.00 90.00 
I (LTV > 67%) 25'125 0.53 0.50 0 1 
I (LTV > 80%) 25'125 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Loan-to-Income (LTI) 25'125 3.59 1.52 0.69 9.62 
I (LTI > 4.5) 25'125 0.23 0.42 0 1 
I (LTI > 5.5) 25'125 0.08 0.27 0 1 
HH Income 25'125 167'603 88'961 48'000 600'000 
Rental Income 25'125 4'232 16'880 0 116'000 
Other Income 25'125 9'381 28'329 0 200'000 
Wealth incl. Pension Fund 25'125 469'333 515'877 10'000 3'180'000 
Age 25'125 46 10 28 73 
(B) Regional Characteristics           
Apartment Price Growth p.a. 25'125 4.79 2.53 -7.33 13.52 
Single-Family Home Price Growth 25'125 4.07 4.07 -3.99 15.27 
Number of Online Providers (NOP) 25'125 10.92 2.52 4 14 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) 25'125 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.49 
Multi-Market Contact (MMC) 25'125 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.40 
(C) Bank Characteristics           
Bank Total Assets (TA) 25'125 16'932 12'841 434 37'804 
Mortgages/TA 25'125 69.82 10.43 39.79 90.62 
Deposits/TA 25'125 47.80 17.90 16.72 65.63 
Capital Ratio 25'125 7.25 1.03 4.72 11.33 
Bank Web Experience in Months 25'125 34.39 14.35 0.00 69.00 
(D) Response Characteristics           
Distance Applicant Bank HQ (100km) 25'125 1.10 0.87 0.00 4.22 
Driving Time Applicant Bank HQ (hours) 25'125 1.30 0.91 0.00 4.42 
House price growth correlation 25'125 0.77 0.19 0.15 1.00 
Relative Over-Heating (ROH) 25'125 1.16 0.17 0.75 2.08 
Responses per Application 25'125 4.24 1.45 1.00 10.00 
Response Time in Hours 25'125 97.41 151.72 -2.73 789.10 
I (Response in <= 48 hours) 25'125 0.53 0.50 0 1 
I (Offer = 1) 25'125 0.82 0.38 0 1 
Weighted Offered FP 20'583 7.36 2.93 0.25 10.00 
Weighted Rate Offered 20'583 2.16 0.56 0.93 3.25 
Weighted Spread Offered 20'583 0.90 0.21 0.49 1.52 
  
 
Panel (A) shows the characteristics of applications for all responses sent in 2010-2013, so the weight of each application 
corresponds to the number of responses received, as in the regressions. (B) shows bank-relevant characteristics of the region 
where the collateral is based. The NOP, HHI and MMC measures of competition vary across the 26 cantons. (C) shows key bank 
characteristics, as well as the number of months for which the bank has been bidding online, and the fraction of responses sent 
out in <= 48 hrs. (D) shows key response characteristics. The distance between applicant and bank headquarters is measured 
once in 100kms and once in hours. House price correlation measures the correlation between year-on-year growth rates in the 
applicant’s and the bank’s canton. Relativer over-heating scales the percentage to which house prices in the applicant’s canton 
are deemed overheated by FPRE by the percentage in the bank’s home canton. Weighted Spread is the amount-weighted 
average across the 1-3 tranches offered, where spread is the rate offered less the swap rate for the corresponding maturity 
prevailing on that day.  
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Table 2: Competition 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
No. of Online Lenders 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HHI in Mortgage Market 0.20*** -0.43*** 0.11 -0.36*** 0.13* -0.46*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) 
Multi-Market Competition 0.17 -0.54*** 0.13 -0.64*** 0.39*** -0.41*** 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) 
Apt. Price Growth -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SFH Price Growth 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.02** 0.05*** -0.01** 0.05*** -0.01** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
I(LTV>=80%) -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.19*** 0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.05*** 0.01** -0.04*** 0.00 -0.04*** 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.18*** 0.04*** -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.19*** 0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
I(Refinancing) -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln(Total Assets)     0.01*** -0.05***     
      (0.00) (0.00)     
Mortgages/TA     0.00*** -0.00***     
      (0.00) (0.00)     
Deposits/TA     -0.00*** 0.00***     
      (0.00) (0.00)     
Equity/TA     0.01*** 0.01***     
      (0.00) (0.00)     
Constant   1.25***   1.77***   1.26*** 
    (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03) 
              
Observations 25'125 20'583 25'125 20'583 25'125 20'583 
R2   0.232   0.281   0.311 
Estimation Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS 
Bank FE No No No No Yes Yes 
 
 
 
  
Columns with unequal numbers show marginal effects from Logit regressions. The number of competitors also 
bidding for applications in the canton ranges from 4 to 14. Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) and Multi-Market 
Contact (MMC) measures are based on banks’ entire existing mortgage portfolios. Apartment and single-family 
home (SFH) price growth in the applicant’s canton is lagged by one year. LTV is the loan-to-value, LTI the loan-to-
income ratio of the applicant. About half of all applications are for refinancing a mortgage rather than for initial 
purchase. All further applicant characteristics (income, wealth, debt, age, house type) are omitted but do not 
change results when included in addition. All estimations include year*month fixed effects to control for time 
trends. Standard errors clustered by household (application) in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Risk Management 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
                  
Distance in 100km 0.00 0.01*** 0.01* -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.03*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Rel. Over-Heating -0.16*** 0.02** -0.02 0.14*** 0.09*** -0.02 -0.25*** 0.29*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Price Correlation -0.11*** 0.09*** -0.05** 0.02* -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.07** -0.03*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
I(LTV>=67%) -0.02** 0.06*** -0.01** 0.06*** -0.01* 0.06***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
I(LTV>=80%) -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.19*** 0.02*** -0.19*** 0.03***     
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
I(LTI>=4.5) -0.04*** 0.00 -0.04*** -0.00 -0.04*** 0.00     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.18*** 0.04*** -0.19*** 0.03*** -0.19*** 0.03***     
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
I(Refinancing) -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***     
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)     
Ln(Total Assets)     0.01*** -0.05***     -0.00 -0.04*** 
      (0.00) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00) 
Mortgages/TA     0.00*** -0.00***     0.00 -0.00*** 
      (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) 
Deposits/TA     -0.00*** 0.00     -0.00* -0.00*** 
      (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) 
Equity/TA     0.01*** 0.01***     0.01 0.01*** 
      (0.00) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant   0.94***   1.47***   0.97***   1.18*** 
    (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.05) 
                  
Observations 25'125 20'583 25'125 20'583 25'125 20'583 25'125 20'583 
R2   0.221   0.274   0.300   0.110 
Estimation Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS 
HH FE No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Bank FE No No No No Yes Yes No No 
 
 
  
Columns with unequal numbers show marginal effects from Logit regressions. Driving Distance in 100km between the 
applicant’s postcode and the bank’s headquarter has been computed using HERE maps and the –georoute- command by 
Weber and Péclat (2016). Price correlation refers to year-on-year house price growth in the applicant’s and the bank’s home 
canton. Price over-heating in the applicant’s home canton, as estimated by FPRE, is scaled by that in the bank’s home canton. 
LTV is the loan-to-value, LTI the loan-to-income ratio of the applicant. About half of all applications are for refinancing a 
mortgage rather than for initial purchase. All further applicant characteristics (income, wealth, debt, age, house type) are 
omitted but do not change results when included in addition. All estimations include year*month fixed effects to control for 
time trends. Standard errors clustered by household (application) in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Rules vs. Discretion in Online Mortgage Pricing 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Price Discretion Price Discretion Price Discretion Price Discretion 
                  
I(LTV>=67%) 0.04*** 0.46*** 0.04*** 0.42*** 0.04*** 0.44*** 0.04*** 0.38*** 
  (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) 
I(LTV>=80%) 0.02*** 0.06 0.02*** 0.04 0.02*** 0.05 0.02*** 0.06 
  (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.10) 
I(LTI>=4.5) 0.00 0.06 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.09) 
I(LTI>=5.5) 0.03*** 0.03 0.03*** -0.06 0.03*** -0.01 0.03*** -0.02 
  (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.14) 
I(Refinancing) -0.02*** -0.04 -0.02*** -0.05 -0.02*** -0.07 -0.02*** -0.04 
  (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) 
I (SFH) -0.01*** -0.07 -0.01* -0.00 -0.01*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 
  (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) 
I (Nonstandard) 0.01** 0.14 0.02*** 0.26*** 0.01*** 0.19** 0.02*** 0.16** 
  (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.04*** -0.20*** -0.04*** -0.19*** -0.04*** -0.18*** -0.07*** -0.08** 
  (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
Mortgages/TA -0.00*** -0.03*** -0.00*** -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.03*** -0.00*** -0.03*** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Deposits/TA 0.00 0.02*** -0.00 0.01* 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.01* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Equity/TA 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.06* 0.01*** 0.08*** 
  (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
No. of Web Lenders -0.01*** -0.06***             
  (0.00) (0.02)             
HHI -0.26*** -1.05             
  (0.03) (0.73)             
MMC -0.55*** -1.76             
  (0.07) (1.47)             
Distance in 100km     -0.01*** -0.12***         
      (0.00) (0.05)         
Rel. Over-Heating     0.09*** 2.02***         
      (0.01) (0.25)         
Price Correlation     0.02* -0.10         
      (0.01) (0.20)         
I(Fast Response)         -0.01*** -0.18***     
          (0.00) (0.06)     
Bank Web Experience             0.01*** -0.02*** 
              (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 1.41 -0.39 1.37*** -3.11*** 1.45*** -1.14 1.17*** -1.69*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.82) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.52) 
R2 0.28   0.28   0.27   0.22   
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Discretion is the variance unexplained in the pricing regressions. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 show that it is not orthogonal to key characteristics 
but varies with them. Bank’s Web Experience is the number of months for which the bank has been offering mortgages through the online 
platform. All other regressors as in Tables 1 and 2 above. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by household (application). * p<0.1, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Offer Dispersion within each Household 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  SD SD SD/Mean SD/Mean 
          
No. of web lenders -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.17 -0.15 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.21) (0.21) 
HHI -26.15*** -25.65*** -20.47** -18.17** 
  (3.59) (3.61) (9.36) (9.25) 
MMC -2.87 -0.58 -5.13 -1.00 
  (7.12) (7.02) (17.58) (17.27) 
I(LTV>=67%) 4.19*** 4.21*** 2.74** 2.77** 
  (0.40) (0.41) (1.34) (1.37) 
I(LTV>=80%) 0.95 1.36 -0.36 0.39 
  (0.83) (0.83) (1.20) (1.11) 
I(LTI>=4.5) 0.10 0.01 0.30 0.15 
  (0.43) (0.43) (1.68) (1.68) 
I(LTI>=5.5) -0.70 -0.63 -2.11 -2.30 
  (0.76) (0.75) (1.79) (1.64) 
I(Refinancing) -0.40 -0.30 -3.07** -2.42* 
  (0.38) (0.39) (1.53) (1.30) 
Constant 19.69*** 20.94*** 18.65*** 22.25*** 
  (1.94) (1.30) (4.27) (4.33) 
          
Observations 5'563 5'563 5'563 5'563 
R2 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.00 
Year*Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
Here we compute the standard deviation (SD) of spreads (amount-weighted where 
an offer consists of 2 or 3 rather than only 1 tranche) between offered rates and 
maturity-consistent interest swap rates applicable on the same day across all 1-10 
offers an application receives. SD are measured in basis points rather than 
percentage points to facilitate interpretation. Then Columns 1 and 3 regress that SD 
on all regressors fixed within an application, while 2 and 4 do so for the SD rescaled 
by the mean spread a household is offered. Columns 1 and 2 control additionally for 
year*month fixed effects to proxy amongst others for the prevailing interest rate 
environment, while Columns 3 and 4 do not. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by household.  * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Heckman 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
                  
No. of Web Lenders 0.03*** -0.01***             
  (0.01) (0.00)             
HHI 0.64** -0.51***             
  (0.30) (0.05)             
MMC 1.72*** -0.35***             
  (0.55) (0.10)             
Distance in 100km     -0.13*** -0.05***         
      (0.03) (0.01)         
Rel. Over-Heating     0.34** 0.52***         
      (0.14) (0.02)         
Price Correlation     -0.35*** 0.03         
      (0.13) (0.02)         
I(Fast Response)         0.14*** 0.02***     
          (0.03) (0.01)     
Web Experience             0.00 0.01*** 
              (0.00) (0.00) 
I (2nd Semester) -0.08***   -0.09***   -0.10***   -0.11***   
  (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   
Constant 0.66*** 1.13*** 1.46*** 0.18*** 1.46*** 0.79*** 1.44*** 0.60*** 
  (0.21) (0.03) (0.31) (0.04) (0.22) (0.03) (0.23) (0.02) 
                  
Observations 25'125 25'125 25'125 25'125 25'125 25'125 25'125 25'125 
R2   0.14   0.17   0.13   0.27 
HH FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
HH Controls Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation MLE MLE Probit 
Two-
Step Probit 
Two-
Step Probit 
Two-
Step 
 
 
  
Columns with unequal numbers display the Heckman first stages, probit regressions of whether the bank’s response is an offer on the 
same regressors as in Tables 1 and 2 plus an indicator for whether the response was sent in months 7-12 rather than 1-6 of the year. 
Even columns show estimates of the main equation controlling for the non-selection hazard. For reasons of software capacity, Columns 
3-8, which control also for household fixed effects, implement this as a two-step procedure. By contrast, Columns 1 and 2 must use 
household controls instead of fixed effects to avoid collinearity with the competition measures of interest. Without household fixed 
effects, estimations can be implemented through Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), which improves estimator efficiency. 
Standard errors clustered by applying household in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 7: Heckman including Non-Responses  
              
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Offer Price Offer Price Offer Price 
              
No. of Web Lenders 0.07*** -0.01***         
  (0.00) (0.00)         
HHI -1.96*** -0.58***         
  (0.12) (0.07)         
MMC 5.29*** -0.32*         
  (0.27) (0.18)         
Distance in 100km     -0.30*** -0.08***     
      (0.01) (0.01)     
Rel. Over-Heating     -0.54*** -0.38***     
      (0.14) (0.03)     
Price Correlation     0.20** 0.09***     
      (0.08) (0.02)     
Web Experience         -0.00*** 0.01*** 
          (0.00) (0.00) 
I (2nd Semester) -0.03**   -0.10***   -0.04***   
  (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   
Constant -2.63*** 1.26*** 0.47** 0.71*** -1.95*** -0.59* 
  (0.06) (0.18) (0.19) (0.08) (0.04) (0.33) 
              
Observations 180'839 180'839 48'567 48'567 180'839 180'839 
R2   0.14   0.14   0.27 
HH FE No No Yes No Yes No 
HH Controls Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method Probit 
Two-
Step Probit 
Two-
Step Probit Two-Step 
 
 
  
This table repeats the estimations of the previous table after filling in non-responses and treating them like 
explicit rejections. Columns with unequal numbers display the Heckman first stages, probit regressions of 
whether the bank’s response is an offer on the same regressors as in Tables 1 and 2 plus an indicator for whether 
the response was sent in months 7-12 rather than 1-6 of the year. Even columns show estimates of the main 
equation controlling for the non-selection hazard. The two columns analyzing a “fast response” dummy have 
been dropped as non-responses cannot be categorized as fast or slow. Furthermore, distance could not be filled 
in for all possible bank household pairs, so that Columns 3 and 4 have fewer observations than the other columns. 
Standard errors clustered by applying household in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A1: Geographical Representativeness of Households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Number of Percentage of % of Mortgages % of Volume 
Canton Applications Applications Swiss Household Panel All Swiss Banks 
Aargau 850 12.28 11.70 8.73 
Appenzell AR 4 0.06 1.12 0.62 
Appenzell IR 33 0.48 0.56 0.18 
Basel Land 287 4.15 3.64 3.86 
Basel Stadt 106 1.53 0.28 1.92 
Berne 982 14.19 17.65 10.77 
Fribourg 220 3.18 5.88 3.23 
Geneva 162 2.34 2.24 5.06 
Glarus 30 0.43 0.84 0.44 
Graubünden 163 2.36 1.96 3.33 
Jura 26 0.38 0.56 0.75 
Lucerne 256 3.70 5.32 4.64 
Neuchatel 73 1.05 5.04 1.53 
Nidwalden 20 0.29 0.84 0.54 
Obwalden 35 0.51 0.84 0.47 
Schaffhausen 71 1.03 0.28 0.94 
Schwyz 142 2.05 1.96 2.37 
Solothurn 238 3.44 2.80 3.37 
St.Gallen 339 4.90 6.16 5.73 
Thurgau 233 3.37 3.08 3.48 
Ticino 182 2.63 3.64 4.73 
Uri 17 0.25 0.00 0.40 
Valais 223 3.22 3.92 3.59 
Vaud 607 8.77 7.28 8.07 
Zug 118 1.71 0.56 2.04 
Zurich 1'503 21.72 14.29 19.19 
Total  6'920 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The distribution in our sample counts each of the 6’920 mortgage applications submitted via 
Comparis.ch once. We can compare it first with the percentages of households in the nationally 
representative Swiss Household Panel (SHP), provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, who 
transition to home ownership in 2008-13 and therefore have outstanding mortgage debt in 2014. 
Finally, we also compare the distribution with that of outstanding mortgage debt already on banks’ 
balance sheets as reported to the supervisory authority in 2013. Note that the latter is available only 
based on all mortgages currently on banks’ balance sheets, rather than on new lending only. Based 
on either comparison, we conclude that the geographical coverage of our mortgage applications is 
largely representative and is not, for instance, biased towards more urban areas. 
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Table A2: Geographical Representativeness of Banks 
  Comparis B&M (2018) 
Canton # banks % of banks # banks % of banks 
Aargau 2 7.41 3 6.00 
Appenzell AR 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Appenzell IR 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Basel Land 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Basel Stadt 2 7.41 4 8.00 
Berne 4 14.81 9 18.00 
Fribourg 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Geneva 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Glarus 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Graubünden 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Jura 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Lucerne 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Neuchatel 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Nidwalden 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Obwalden 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Schaffhausen 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Schwyz 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Solothurn 2 7.41 4 8.00 
St. Gallen 4 14.81 3 6.00 
Thurgau 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Ticino 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Uri 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Valais 1 3.70 1 2.00 
Vaud 1 3.70 4 8.00 
Zug 0 0.00 1 2.00 
Zurich 4 14.81 5 10.00 
Total  27 100.00 50 100.00 
 
 
 
  
This table compares the distribution of banks’ headquarters across the 26 
cantons of Switzerland with that in Basten and Mariathasan (2018), who select 
the universe of Swiss retail banks based on the FINMA definition that at least 55% 
of bank income must be net interest income or loan fees, as opposed to stem 
from own trading or wealth management advisory services. 
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Table A3: Non-Geographical Representativeness of Households and Banks 
A. Comparison of household characteristics with the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 
  
Our sample SHP Difference  
(1) (2) (3) 
Age 46.10 45.51 0.60 
  (10.21) (1.17) (10.45) 
Household Income 167'603 147'649 19'999 
  (89'061) (318'066) (172'429) 
Number of observations 25'125 357 25'494 
          
B. Comparison of mortgage risk characteristics with SNB (2014)   
  
Our sample SNB  Difference  
(1) (2) (3) 
Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio > 80% (0/1) 0.07 0.16 -0.09 
 (0.26) (--) (--) 
Payment-to-Income (PTI) ratio>33% (0/1) 0.39 0.40 -0.01 
 (0.13) (--) (--) 
Number of observations 25'125 (--) (--) 
          
C. Comparison of bank characteristics with Basten and Mariathasan (2018) 
  
Our sample B&M (2018) Difference 
(1) (2) (3) 
Total Assets  9'866 12'185 -2'319 
  (11'910) (22'215) (25'206) 
CET1 in % of Total Assets 7.19 7.75 -0.56 
  (1.53) (1.66) (2.26) 
Deposits in % of Total Assets 67.53 47.71 19.83 
  (5.47) (11.00) (12.28) 
Number of observations 27 50 77 
 
Panel A compares households in our sample with those in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) who recently bought 
a house or apartment. Panel B compares the 2 key risk characteristics of each mortgage with those reported in 
the SNB Financial Stability Report 2014, and Panel C compares banks in our sample with the full sample of those 
50 Swiss banks focused on deposit-taking and lending. We always compare all characteristics available both in 
our sample and in the respective benchmark. Column (1) always shows the mean value in our sample and in 
brackets the standard error. Column (2) shows the respective values for the benchmark sample, except for Panel 
B where none are given. Column (3) computes the difference and the pooled standard error to evaluate its 
statistical significance. 
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